Reason and Concern

By Ronquillo C. Tolentino

Prosecution Centers On Betrayal

of Public Trust

The Supreme Court in Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. (G.R. No. 160261, November 10,2003) amplified the concept of betrayal of public trust as a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under the Constitution. It did not prescribed which branch of the government has the power to define it, but implies that Congress which handles impeachment cases has the power to do so.

True that the pro-secution in the impeach-ment case against Chief Justice Renato Corona waived the presentation of evidence in Articles of Impeachment 1, 4, 5, 6 and 8. But a perusal of Articles 2, 3 and 7 would show the impeachable offense of betrayal of public trust.

In an article written by lawyer Reynaldo Geronimo, the Trust Guru. titled “ Betrayal of Public Trust - the framers’ intent”, he traced that at the Constitutional Commission during the July l986 floor deliberation, Commissioner Rustico delos Reyes,Jr. introduced at the Committee level the inclusion of “betrayal of public trust” but it was Commissioner Ricardo Romulo who explained what it meant during the period of debate in answer to Commissioner Florenz Regalado’s query, Geronimo recounted that Romulo said that “betrayal of public trust was a catchall phrase…[ that] refers to his oath of office, in the end that the idea of a public trust is connected with the oath of office of the officer, and if he violates that oath of office, then he has betrayed that trust”.

Further, Commissioner Romulo also emphasized that the term as a catchall phrase includes all acts which are not punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in office. It includes betrayal of public interest, inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official duty by malfeasance or misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism, and others to the prejudice of public interest and which tend to bring the office into disrepute…”

As Geronimo stated in the conclusion of his article: “Clearly then, the intent of the framers of the current constitution is to make the impeachable officers answer for any act, criminal or otherwise, that violates their oath of office. That is the final question that the Senators would have to determine sooner or later with respect to Chief Justice Renato Corona.”

The prosecution may have had considered that among the impeachable offenses enumerated in Sec, 2, Art. XI of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust would be easy to prove for the removal of the respondent chief justice.

Aklan political observers surmise that three months reckoned from April 2012, probable candidates for the gubernatorial and congressional positions to oppose the Miraflores-Marquez team shall eventually be known albeit Banga Mayor Antonio Mameng had announced his 110 percent intention to run as congressman for Aklan’s lone district.

Prosecution Rests Case Too Early

The Prosecution in the Impeachment Trial against Chief Justice Renato Corona feeling that they have enough evidence to pin down the respondent Chief Justice after presenting evidence in Articles of Impeachment 2, 3 and 7, rested their case. Thus, the Prosecution waived and abandoned presenting evidence for Articles 1, 4, 5, 6 and 8.

The Articles of Impeachment relied upon by the Prosecution for the presumption of guilt,or if you may, conviction of Chief Justice Renato Corona, are hereunder reproduced verbatim, as follows :

ARTICLE II

RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS STATE-MENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES, AND NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE III

RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII, SECTION 7 (3) OF THE CONSTI-TUTION WHICH PROVIDES THAT “[A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE” IN ALLOWING THE SUPREME COURT TO ACT ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF FLIP-FLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL AND EXE-CUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN EXCES-SIVE ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING WITH LITI-GANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.

ARTICLE VII

RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN GRAN-TING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AND HER HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S OWN TRO.

The withdrawal of the five Articles of Impeachment prompted Senator Francisco Escudero to make the observation that the prosecution’s withdrawal is equivalent to amending the complaint. The withdrawal spurred Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago to lecture lengthily to the prosecution on the Rules of Court. Too, the Iloilo lady senator commented on the alleged trial by publicity resorted to by the prosecution and her observation on the rather vainglorious declaration of the prosecution that they are already victorious making a travesty of the Senate as Impeachment Court who have as yet to weigh all evidence presented coupled with their judgment.

Lawyer Vitaliano Aguirre was held in contempt by the Impeachment Court for showing disrespect to Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago when he placed his hands on both ears playing deaf to what the lady senator from Iloilo was manifesting.

It is fundamental for lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and should insists on similar conduct by others. That is mandated in Canon II, Code of Professional Responsibility. This canon should constantly remind lawyers that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The faithful performance of this duty is necessary for the stability of democratic institutions. (Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 (1988). /MP